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UNCTAD (vnktad) [Origin obscure, poss.fr.
unct obsol. chiefly Sc. to anoint, to smear with oil,
to exhibit soothing complacency of speech or
conduct, fr. Lat. unct- p.pl. stem of ung(u)ere, to
smear, etc. So F. onction (12th cent.); Ital.
unzione; Sp. uncion; Pg. unçâo, etc: -ad, feminine
patronymic or poetic fantasy; cf. cyclades, dryad,
Iliad, Lusiad, Dunciad] n. 1. (Obsol). One of the
early global rites held regularly before establish-
ment of Universal Benevolent State. Similar to
Olympiads, except that form of competion em-
phasized rhetorical rather than athletic prowess,
and rules of competition were less clearly forma-
lized. 2. Any gathering at which hostility is
veiled by expression of high-minded sentiment,
and constructive action thwarted by passage of
elusive resolutions. Cf. unctaddery, a form of
rhetoric, involving liberal use of certain charac-
teristic words ("comprehensive", "integrated",
"urgent", "should", etc.) particularly associated
with such gatherings.
(Source: Oxford English Dictionary, excavated,
reconstructed and revised edition, Peking, The
Enlightenment Press UBS 103 (A.D. 2176))
Jokes, I suppose, especially elaborate bad jokes,
are a sign of nervousness. And one does feel
nervous about UNCTAD IV.
In the last 12 years the environment scare, the
resource scare, our inability to take a grip on
inflation without plunging the capitalist world
into its first serious post-war recession, have made
us somewhat less optimistic than we were in
1964 about mankind in general. And the experi-
ence of three UNCTAD conferences has taught
us to be less hopeful about their potential achieve-
ments in particular. One hesitates to be too hope-
ful. There are some promising signs (for example,
resolutions of the Seventh Special Session a good
deal more encouraging than the outcome of the
Sixth; the substantial preparation by the
UNCTAD Secretariat of the groundwork for
workable institutions) but still one hesitates to
hope for too much. One of the points which
Reginald Green makes in his contribution is that
perhaps we do our hoping and despairing about
the wrong things. It is the grand conferences
which get reported, but the committees and work-
ing parties they set upthe committees where the
operating details of new institutions are settled-
which can really push mankind a little further on
the road towards rationality and, if brotherhood
2
is too much to hope for, at least greater recogni-
tion of mutual interest.
Which is not to say that the tone set, and the
guidelines laid down by the big-occasion confer-
ences are unimportant. That is why the compo-
sition and weight of Britain's delegation which
Judith Hart discusses in her article is a matter
of considerable moment, and why the nature of
the "British position" which is packed into those
official briefcases is of great concern to those of
us who believe, with UNCTAD's Secretary
General, that UNCTAD IV can be a crucial test
of the world's ability to order its affairs with
regard to the interests of all its citizens. One
would hope that if, as she suggests, a Minister
goes to Nairobi it should be one who sees the
importance of UNCTAD in that light, not one
whose departmental duties predispose him to
see it primarily in the light of short-term anxieties
about Britain's balance of payments.
It is certainly true that the language of confron-
tation is a good deal more strident today than it
was at the time of the first UNCTAD meeting.
Dudley Seers argues in his contribution that the
old First World and Third World categories are
no longer the economically relevant ones. He is
surely right, but false consciousness or not, the
sense that outside the Socialist world, the great
overall division is that between the developed
world and the developing seems still to be a
strong one. And in those dichotomous terms the
shift in the international pattern in the world over
the last decade may be seen (comfortingly, if one
takes a long enough perspective?) as analogous
to the shift in class relations in Britain between,
say, 1890 and the 1920s. The Victorian age when
charity was deferentially accepted by the deserv-
ing poor has gone. There is talk of organising
voting majorities, seizing control of the central
institutions, asserting collective economic power
in general strikes. With the academic support of
the so-called dependency theory of underdevelop-
ment, as it spreads from Latin America to the rest
of the Third World (and the universities of the
First World too), more and more representatives
of the developing countries are prepared to place
the whole blame for their poverty on an unfair in-
ternational economic system which exploits them.
(As if better terms of trade, the curbing of the
multinationals and free transfer of more appro-
priate technology would solve all their internal
problems tooof low savings ratios, population
growth, low levels of technological expertise or
entrepreneurial initiative, or whatever they are.)
And the rich country reaction: "how dare they
question the justice of our privileges" becomes
more strident. American Secretaries of State have
often behaved as if they felt that in all inter-
national forums they were entitled to unwavering
upport for US policy from any recipient of US
aid. It is only recently that a Secretary of State
has openly declared that to be a reasonable
policy principle (at least as far as concerns voting
in the UN).
That there are many shared interests across the
lines of confrontationthat many international
games are not zero-sum gamesis the point made
by Richard Jolly: the stake we have iii avoiding
recession and unemployment makes a regulated
stability of major items of world trade well worth
paying for in significant transfers of wealth to the
poorer countries. It remains true, of course, that
all negotiation involves a mixture, or an oscilla-
tion, between confrontation and co-operation,
between the attempt to coerce and the attempt to
reach compromise agreement. Hence it is in a
sense a false dichotomy to ask: can the poor
countries improve their terms of trade only by
the confrontational tactics of the producer cartel,
or are negotiated agreements between producers
and consumers the only way ahead? It may well
be, as Hanns Maull argues, that in the long-run
even the oil producers cannot dispense with the
co-operation of consumers, but there can be little
doubt that the unilateral flexing of their OPEC
muscles was the only way they could have
achieved a sudden quadrupling of oil pricesand
immeasurably improved their position in eventual
negotiations. How much clout developing country
producers of other commodities are likely in fact
to be able to wield is the subject of the contribu-
tions by Hanns Maull and William Page. Paul
Streeten reminds us that this is not simply a
datum. Producer power is something which can
be increased by taking thoughtby institutional
devices such as diversification funds which can
serve to enhance loyalty by making rule-observing
virtue more profitable. The need to devise such
institutions, the technical expertise which their
creation and maintenance requires, suggests the
need, as Reginald Green and G. K. Helleiner
argue, for a developing countries' OECD, a secre-
tariat which can ensure that as the new rounds of
issue-specific negotiations proceed, the case for
the developing nations does not go by default.
The creation of such a secretariat would also
incidentally mean that the UNCTAD secretariat
could not only be, but also be seen to be, the
servant of the world community. Reginald Green
makes a telling point when he suggests that
UNCTAD's commodity proposals are frequently
regarded as a set of "Third World proposals"
only because there is no organisation to prepare
what really would be a reasonable maximal
negotiating position for the Third World.
Those commodity proposals have inevitably domi-
nated much of the discussion of the UNCTAD
agenda, and Joe Callan's tabulation of the main
positions taken on some of these issues will, we
hope, provide a useful reference source. The
key questionfor readers of the JDS Bulletin at
leastis how far such agreements can succeed
not only in stabilising prices but also in contri-
buting, in an orderly, non-disruptive and
politically acceptable way, to the transfer
of income from the richer to poorer countries.
Angus Hone's discussion of the possibilities of
indexation suggests some crucial considerations.
Carlos Fortin's shrewd analysis of the limits to
income transfer possibilities under the tin agree-
ment should give the proponents of buffer-stock
schemes pause for thought. As our straw poll
shows, a number of people who have thought
about these things see greater hope in other
forms of agreementreductions in tariff barriers,
especially against processed products, codes for
technology transfer, an LDC advisory service,
debt rescheduling, etc. (And may the Editors take
this opportunity of thanking all those who res-
ponded at such short notice to the questionnaire.)
Hans Singer also discusses priorities. His compari-
son of compensatory financing and buffer-stock
schemes builds up a powerful case for the
tactical and strategic advantages of the former.
One might add, developing the analogy drawn
above between the evolution of British politics in
the early 1920s and recent trends in the
world system, that a compensatory financing
scheme, introducing an automaticity into the
resource-transfer process, can hasten the transfor-
mation of aid into a redistributive world taxation
system, just as internally Victorian charity has
been replaced by the principle of benefit entitle-
ments as a part of the basic rights of citizenship.
Most of our contributors are concerned to advo-
cate and not just to analyse. (And it is, of course,
as in this editorial, personal opinions which are
on offer, not opinions which can be attributed to
the IDS.) If more of the advice and persuasion
is directed at Third World governments than at
our own, this is not simply a recognition of the
IDS's intended role as a purveyor of well-mean-
ing advice to the developing countriesa role
which we are happy to supplement, especially
in this issue, by acting as the mere transmitter of
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the thoughts of distinguished Third World citizens
to other Third World readers. It is also a recogni-
tion of the facts which Messrs Helleiner and
Green describethat the Third World is in
greater danger of letting its own interests go by
default than is the British government. The
message we would convey to the British govern-
ment is a simple one and implicit in the whole
issue. Let that "position", when it is packed into
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the official briefcases next May, be one which
recognises that UNCTAD is not merely, or even
primarily, about defending Britain's short-term
interests in the footwear trade or tea prices, but
has a crucial role to play in furthering our more
long-term interest in creating a world whose
disparities in wealth are reduced to tolerable
proportions.
R.P.D.
